The following is a report distributed May 9 by the JCPA (Jewish Council for Public Affairs) the organized Jewish community’s umbrella agency for policy analysis. It’s an article by Major General (res.) Yaakov Amidror, program director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
While I take his sober assessment seriously, I also see it as flawed for ignoring the prospects for diplomatic progress as a means of allaying the military threats posed by Hizbullah in Lebanon (via possible negotiations with Syria) and Hamas in Gaza (via engaging with Mahmoud Abbas and the Saudi/Arab League initiative). It also has nothing to say about the genuine humanitarian crisis that Palestinians have been suffering as a result of Israeli and international reactions to Hamas; I find fault both with Hamas, which has totally failed to stop violence against Israel, and the international reaction that has impoverished the Palestinian people – R. Seliger.
In general terms, the Winograd Commission Report dealt mostly with the flaws in the decision-making process in Israel. However, the report contains important insights into the strategic thinking that was predominant in the Israeli political-military leadership from the time of Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon until the outbreak of hostilities in July 2006, with the advent of the Second Lebanon War:
* Israel completed its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2000. It was hoped that the withdrawal would erode the legitimacy of any continuing military activity by Hizbullah, especially in Lebanon’s internal politics. At that time the Israeli government declared that any violation of Israeli sovereignty would bring about a harsh and immediate Israeli response.
* These declarations stipulated that in the event of any assault on Israeli soldiers or civilians, all of Lebanon, Syria, and Hizbullah would be affected. The purpose of these statements was to build up Israeli deterrence in the aftermath of the withdrawal. Effective deterrence of this sort was critical for Israel, the Winograd Commission Report explains, for a number of reasons: after the Israeli pullout from Lebanon there was a lack of “elementary depth,” there were many points of friction with Hizbullah, and finally there were multiple Israeli targets – both civilian and military – adjacent to the new Israeli-Lebanese boarder. At the same time, within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the view developed that if need be, Israel could use “levers of influence” to restrain Hizbullah, such as attacks on Lebanese infrastructure and Syrian targets, as well.
* Despite these strong declarations, Israel only responded locally to the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in October 2000. The Winograd Commission Report presents the assessment of Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh that the Israeli government at the time did not respond more forcefully because it did not want to show that its Lebanon withdrawal had actually produced an escalatory effect. Moreover, the Second Intifada had erupted and the Israeli government was concerned about having to wage a two-front war. This policy of restraint continued through March 2002, when Hizbullah attacked inside Israel near the town of Shlomi.
* As a result, another view became deeply rooted in the Israeli national security establishment that Hizbullah’s military buildup after Israel’s Lebanon pullout was not so terrible as long as relative quiet along the border was preserved. Israel knew that Hizbullah was gaining strength and acquiring weaponry, but it preferred to turn a blind eye. As a result, Israel did not prepare for war with an enemy that was far more powerful than what it was familiar with in the past.
Implications for the Gaza Strip:
* In the Gaza Strip, a similar process is underway. Hamas is getting stronger as it organizes itself, digs fortifications underground, and builds up its military capabilities. Israel will have to ask itself whether it is preferable to delay the confrontation with Hamas, because meanwhile there is quiet or a temporary truce or some other illusory understanding. We are likely to find ourselves in exactly the same position in Gaza that we created with respect to Lebanon.
* The Winograd Commission Report, which does not deal with the Gaza problem, describes Israeli policy toward Lebanon during 2000-2006 as a policy of “containment.” Strictly speaking there is a problem with this terminology for what Israel pursued in Lebanon during this period, was not a pure policy of containment, which by definition implies preventing an adversary from reinforcing its capabilities.
* What Israel is doing today in the Gaza Strip is not containment either, but rather a case of ignoring reality completely. It is an extremely costly policy. Few have any idea what price Israel will have to pay if it moves into Gaza in two or three years, when Hamas feels strengthened and has the capability to launch 122mm Katyusha rockets -which Hizbullah possessed in the thousands – as far as Ashdod and Kiryat Gat. Israeli decision-makers will have to take into account that inaction has a price, as well.
* Anyone who has dealt with military affairs knows that it is impossible to thwart the firing of Katyusha or Qassam rockets by means of artillery fire, or by means of any land-based or air-based firepower. The Winograd Commission Report details, nonetheless, how many of Israel’s operational plans for Lebanon during 2002-2004 did not require the use of maneuver units on the ground.
* It is now clear that the only way to thwart rocket attacks is by controlling the situation on the ground. Qassam rockets are today landing in Sderot and Ashkelon – and not in Kfar Saba – because Israel does not control the situation on the ground in Gaza, whereas it has control of the ground around Qalqilya.
* For political reasons, the IDF was not permitted by the political echelon to cross the Israeli-Lebanese border from 2000 to 2006. This allowed Hizbullah to conduct exercises day and night and to attack at will, while Israel was unable to stop any of its preparations. The only way to deal with such a situation in the long term is to allow the IDF to cross the border and halt such offensive preparations. As long as no responsible government is preventing attacks against Israeli territory, the IDF will have to adopt such an approach both with respect to its northern border with Lebanon and its southern border with the Gaza Strip.
***The opinions expressed in the Middle East Briefing do not necessarily convey those of JCPA*** Nor do they particularly reflect the opinions of Meretz USA.
Hi Ralph,
Uh, this is pretty far out of line:
“It also has nothing to say about the genuine humanitarian crisis that Palestinians have been suffering as a result of Israeli and international reactions to Hamas; I find fault both with Hamas, which has totally failed to stop violence against Israel, and the international reaction that has impoverished the Palestinian people – R. Seliger.”
Whether you or I like Hamas, we all need to acknowledge that the number of Israeli deaths since Hamas assumed power is the lowest it has been by far for the last six and half years! (to be fair the serious decline began in early 2005 when Hamas declared a unilaterial ceasefire). Since April 1, 2006, according to B’Tselem, 16 Israeli civilians and 6 Israeli soldiers have been killed by Palestinians. I believe most of the civilians were killed by Islamic Jihad. During that same period, 653 Palestinians have been killed, a ratio of 30 Palestinians killed for every Israeli!
As you know, since September 2000, around 1000 Israelis have been killed and over 4000 Palestinians have been killed. 22 Israelis killed in 13 months is a dramatic reduction in lethal violence against Israelis.
To claim that Hamas has “TOTALLY failed to stop violence against Israel” seems a serious overstatement that simply does not correspond with reality.
Again, like ’em or not (and I don’t), this is what Hamas has done.
Zack
I’m very much in favor of recognizing and expanding any ceasefire as vital milestones on the road to peace. This would include any measures made by Hamas in this regard.
What Zack omits (hopefully NOT intentionally) is that the on-again, off-again “lull” that Hamas officially followed for about a year was not imposed upon other armed factions. In fact, Hamas (speaking as the government, mind you) did not even condemn suicide attacks against Tel Aviv and other targets hit in Israel during this time. To the contrary, Hamas made statements about the Palestinians’ “right to resist.”
Furthermore, Hamas (even as the government) has made no effort to end daily rocket attacks against Israeli towns, especially Sderot.
Moreover, Hamas announced that it cooperated with other groups in their cross-border raid that killed two soldiers and captured a third prompting Israel’s bloody rampage in the Gaza Strip last summer. It is these violent and two-faced tactics — in response to Israel’s total withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 — that have again politically undermined the peace camp in Israel. I’d like to think that this can change, but Hamas has totally failed to be a force for progress and good for their people.
Hi Ralph,
Your response is disingenous. I never said Hamas had stopped all violence against Israelis, I said they had dramatically reduced violence to a level not seen since September, 2000, and thus your claim that Hamas had “totally failed to stop violence against Israel” was very inaccurate.
Again,since April 1, 2006 when the Hamas government assumed power, according to B’Tselem, 16 Israeli civilians and 6 Israeli soldiers have been killed by Palestinians, with most of the civilians were killed by Islamic Jihad. During that same period, 653 Palestinians have been killed, over half non-combattants, a ratio of 30 Palestinians killed for every Israeli. Do you really believe that Islamic Jihad would not have carried out more attacks on Israel if it was not under pressure from Hamas and Fateh to stop attacks?
Again, since September 2000, around 1000 Israelis have been killed and over 4000 Palestinians have been killed. 22 Israelis killed in 13 months is a dramatic reduction in lethal violence against Israelis.
Ralph, you may not like them, but these are the actual facts. Again, I have no desire to defend Hamas, but I am committed to making factual arguments.
Zack
Our friend Zack gives full credit to Hamas for the much lower level of Israeli losses in the last two years rather than even to consider that the Intifada has been beaten back by Israel.
Is Hamas acting against terror when it actually praises the relatively few attacks that have gotten thru? Is Hamas acting against terror when its own people participated in the cross-border raid that capatured Corporal Shalit? Is Hamas acting against terror when some of its own people particpate with other groups in launching rocket attacks across the border?
As I’ve said, I’m all in favor of promoting and expanding ceasefires, but Hamas has at best been half-hearted here. If they want everybody to believe that they want to live in peace with Israel, they need to say so, and then back this up by moving against Islamic Jihad and the clans and criminal gangs that now operate out of Gaza.
Ralph,
Let’s try one final time:
Ralph: Hamas has “totally failed to stop violence against Israel.”
Reality: During 13 month Hamas rule lowest number of Israelis killed (22) by far in 6 1/2 years. Hamas participates in raids that kill two Israeli soldiers and capture one, and participates in some rocket firing from Gaza that results in few Israeli casualties. 653 Palestinians, more than half non-combattants, killed by Israel during same period.
Zack
I don’t dispute Zack’s statistics (although I’d want a few words with him if I lived in Sderot, subject to daily bombardment). What I’m saying is that Hamas and the other violent factions have been basically defeated by Israel; Hamas hasn’t stopped out of goodness. The fact that they still attempt to hurt Israelis, and that they still see an advantage in this, is perverse and contrary to the best interests of the Palestinian people.
Hi Ralph,
I want to comment on this assertion that you made, “What I’m saying is that Hamas and the other violent factions have been basically defeated by Israel; Hamas hasn’t stopped out of goodness.”
Again, I’m no supporter of Hamas nor of attacks on Israelis, however, I think you have misread Hamas and Palestinian realities. Hamas made a strategic decision to enter the Palestinian political arena in early 2005 and to stop attacks at that moment. They did so feeling they were in a position of strength. They have largely stuck with their ceasefire since then. I think it is a serious misunderstanding to believe that Hamas was defeated militarily, not at all. They were, however, responding to a degree to overall fatigue in Palestinian society. They felt more compelled to take into account to the wishes of all of Palestinian society once they entered government, somewhat as Abu Mazen had projected.
I do not really believe you would find too many analysts who believe Hamas stopped attacks because they were defeated militarily, mostly it was a political decision.
Zack